Thursday, November 02, 2006

Hacking The Precinct Vote

Problem TWO: “Hacking The Precinct Vote”

We know that the Diebold precinct optical scanners do have “interpreted code” in use, a type of programming banned under the FEC rules concerning voting systems.

Thomas W Ryan Ph.D on INTERPRETED CODE:

“This is code that is readable by humans and modifiable by humans. This is kind of code that is often used by scientists and engineers …because it is easily modifiable, and should be used only in an experimental environment.

It should never be used in any device or system that requires security and [it] is explicitly prohibited by the 2002 Federal Election code.”

Confirmation comes from University of California, Berkeley report on the Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuBasic Interpreter Voting Systems Technology Assessment Advisory Board of 2/14/2006.

HBO starting tonight will show “Hacking Democracy” http://www.hbo.com/docs/programs/hackingdemocracy/index.html on how this was done in Leon County, Florida. This incident is often referred to as the “Hursti Hack”. Finnish security expert Harri Hursti proved that field editing of the interpreted code by a semi-sophisticated hacker could produce a faked paper tape audit trail, or a pre-stuffed “electronic ballot box” memory device containing negative and positive votes to throw the election in any conceivable direction.

Solution to protect precinct votes:

Fortunately SB1557 audits (when performed effectively and comprehensively) are better set up to catch “precinct vote hacking” than they are early vote auditing. SB1557 must therefore be aggressively implemented and if any Party tries to sit out the process to “veto” it, we must make rapid connections with the other parties to end-run obstruction. Pima County did this successfully in the post-primary recount, going so far as to recruit extra volunteers and loan them to the Libertarian Party as counters approved by the L.P. county chair. This model can be replicated. We get effective auditing out of it.

We believe that working with elections staff per Arizona Revised Statutes, a visibly transparent and fair election can be presented to the public. We intend to accomplish this in accord with the procedures manual created by the Arizona Secretary of State as of August 2006.

This publication is available in PDF:

http://www.azsos.gov/election/Electronic_Voting_System/2006/2006_Electronic_Procedures_Manual.pdf

ELECTIONREPORTING...........................................................................156

Election Night Reporting............................................................................156

ELECTION REPORTING

Election Night Reporting

Upon initial tabulation of election results, and additionally as new results are tabulated, the counties will communicate election results to the secretary of state in an agreed upon electronic format using an application supplied by the secretary of state. The results shall not be released before 8:00 p.m. on Election Day, or until all polls are closed, whichever occurs first. (Page 156)
Posted by Protect Democracy :: 11/02/2006 01:11:00 PM :: ---------------oOo---------------